總有人覺得巴菲特是科技盲，甚至巴菲特自己也樂于以這種形象示人，在鏡頭面前總是說自己連智能手機都不會用。其實只要想一想巴菲特與比爾蓋茨的關(guān)系，以及巴菲特本人的資源與學(xué)習(xí)能力，對于科技的理解肯定是要超過99%的投資者的。

(資料圖片)

1997年的時候，微軟內(nèi)部有一個高管給巴菲特發(fā)了郵件，詳細(xì)對比了微軟和可樂的商業(yè)模式，并且推薦巴菲特買微軟的股票。然而，巴菲特并沒有出手，我們一起來看一下為什么？

這封信前面是在講橄欖球相關(guān)的東西，我們略過不看，來看一下 Jeff Raikes 對微軟生意的介紹：(有刪減掉一些不重要的信息)

While many people would see our business as complicated or hard to understand, I am absolutely convinced an astute investor can learn our business in only 3 to 4 hours (and probably less than two hours if BillG explained It!). (雖然許多人認(rèn)為我們的業(yè)務(wù)復(fù)雜或難以理解，但我完全相信一個精明的投資者可以在只有3到4個小時的時間內(nèi)學(xué)習(xí)我們的業(yè)務(wù)（如果Bill Gates解釋的話，可能還不到兩個小時）！)

In some respects I see the business characteristics of Coca Cola or See’s Candy as being very similar to Microsoft. I think you would love the simplicity of the operating system business. E.g. in FY96 there were 50 million PC’s sold In the world, and about 80% of them were licensed for a Microsoft operating system. Although I would never write down the analogy of a “toll bridge”, people outside our company might describe this business in that way. Those 40 million licenses averaged about $45 per for a total of about $1.88 In revenue. By the way, the remaining 1OM PC’s were largely running Microsoft operating systems we didn’t get paid for them. This problem – piracy – if reduced, is one of the key upsides to our business. (在某些方面，我認(rèn)為可口可樂或喜詩糖果的業(yè)務(wù)特征與微軟非常相似。我認(rèn)為你會喜歡操作系統(tǒng)業(yè)務(wù)的簡單性。例如，在1996年，全球銷售了5000萬臺PC，其中大約80%的PC都獲得了微軟操作系統(tǒng)的許可證。雖然我永遠不會把這個比喻成“收過路費的橋”，但公司外部的人可能會以這種方式描述這項業(yè)務(wù)。這4000萬個許可證的平均價格約為每個45美元，總收入約為18.8億美元。順便說一句，剩下的1000萬臺PC主要在運行我們沒有得到報酬的微軟操作系統(tǒng)。這個盜版問題如果減少，是我們業(yè)務(wù)的一個關(guān)鍵優(yōu)勢之一。)

In FY2000, there will be about 100M PC’s sold. We think we can reduce piracy to 10% and license 90% or 90M of the PC’s. But we also have pricing discretion – I think l heard this term used In conjunction with your pricing decisions on See’s Candy. We will be transitioning the world to a new version of our operating system, Windows NT. Today, we get more than $100 per system for NT, but only on a small percentage of the PC’s. But NT will be on closer to 70% of the PC’s sold in FY2000. We can achieve average license revenue of $80. So 90M licenses at $80 per license totals about $7.2B, up from just under $2B in 3 to 4 years. And since there are effectively no COGs and a WW sales force of only 100·150 people this is a 90%+ margin business. There is an R&D charge to the business. but I’m sure the profits are probably as good as the syrup business! （到FY2000年，將有大約1億臺PC出售。我們認(rèn)為我們可以將盜版率降至10％，并授權(quán)90％或9000萬臺PC。但我們也有定價自由，我想我在和你討論喜詩糖果的定價決策時聽到過這個術(shù)語。我們將向全球推出我們的新操作系統(tǒng)Windows NT。今天，我們每個NT系統(tǒng)收取的費用超過100美元，但只有少數(shù)PC需要付費。但是，NT將出現(xiàn)在2000年銷售的PC中約70％的PC上。我們可以實現(xiàn)每個許可證平均80美元的收入。因此，9000萬個許可證每個80美元，總計約72億美元，而3至4年前不到20億美元。由于實際上沒有成本費用，而全球銷售人員只有100-150人，因此這是一個90％以上的利潤率業(yè)務(wù)。該業(yè)務(wù)存在研發(fā)費用，但我相信利潤可能和糖漿業(yè)務(wù)一樣好?。?/i>

There is actually upside in the number of PC’s sold. Similar to your analysis of Coca Cola, the penetration of PC’s in International markets leaves a lol of room for growth. In the US, the number of PC’s per 1000 people is around 400 or so, but the number drops off rapidly lo 100 or less in most countries, even in some of the European countries.（實際上，在出售的PC數(shù)量方面存在上升空間。類似于您對可口可樂的分析，PC在國際市場上的滲透率還有很大的增長空間。在美國，每1000人中的PC數(shù)量約為400左右，但在大多數(shù)國家，甚至在一些歐洲國家，該數(shù)量迅速下降到100或更少。）

The business described above is what we call the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) business, meaning our revenue comes from the manufacturers of the PC’s. The majority of the rest of the business is called the “finished goods” business. It consists of businesses or individuals buying office productivity software, educational or entertainment software, etc. Again the structure is very simple. A PC is just a razor that needs blades, and we measure our revenue on the basis off per PC, In FY96, nearly 50M PC’s were purchased and Microsoft averaged about $140 in software revenue per PC or $7B. This amount is in addition to the OEM royalty business I described above. （上述業(yè)務(wù)是我們所謂的OEM（原始設(shè)備制造商）業(yè)務(wù)，這意味著我們的收入來自于個人電腦制造商。大多數(shù)其他業(yè)務(wù)被稱為“成品”業(yè)務(wù)。它包括購買辦公生產(chǎn)力軟件、教育或娛樂軟件等的企業(yè)或個人。同樣，結(jié)構(gòu)非常簡單。個人電腦只是一種需要刀片的剃須刀，我們根據(jù)每臺個人電腦的基礎(chǔ)來衡量我們的收入。在FY96，有近5000萬臺個人電腦被購買，微軟每臺個人電腦平均約有140美元的軟件收入，或者說為70億美元。這個數(shù)字是我上面描述的OEM版稅業(yè)務(wù)之外的。 ）

So in some sense that is it. There are a certain number of PC’s that get sold, a growing amount of Microsoft software per PC, the power to – use the brand to sell even more software, some pricing discretion, international market (growth, and the opportunity to grow revenue by further reduction in piracy. Obviously, I’m not going through all the details we’d discuss in a couple hour session, but that is the heart or the business. Of course there is the R&D invested to build the software, but that is similar to Disney continuing to produce new content, or Nebraska Furniture Mart continuing to keep their format fresh, and an Investment that BillG manages very closely.（所以在某種程度上就是這樣。有一定數(shù)量的個人電腦被銷售，微軟軟件的數(shù)量不斷增長，使用品牌銷售更多軟件的能力，一些定價自由度，國際市場（增長），以及通過進一步減少盜版來增加收入的機會。顯然，我不會在幾個小時的會議中討論所有細(xì)節(jié)，但這就是業(yè)務(wù)的核心。當(dāng)然，還有研發(fā)投資用于構(gòu)建軟件，但這類似于迪士尼繼續(xù)制作新內(nèi)容，或者內(nèi)布拉斯加家具商城繼續(xù)保持其新鮮格式的投資，這也是比爾蓋茨密切管理的投資。）

So I really don’t see our business as being significantly more difficult to understand than the other great businesses you’ve invested in. But there is one potential difference that worries me, and it is a key part of the reason I spent the time to share these thoughts with you. The difference I worry about is the “width of the moat. With Coca Cola, you can feel pretty confident that there won’t be a fast shift in user preferences away from drinking sodas, and in particular Coke. In technology, we may more frequently see “paradigm shifts” where old leaders are displaced by new. Graphical user interface replaces character user interface, the Internet explodes, etc. (所以，我真的不認(rèn)為我們的業(yè)務(wù)比您投資的其他大企業(yè)更難理解。但有一個潛在的差異讓我感到擔(dān)憂，這也是我花時間與您分享這些想法的關(guān)鍵原因。我擔(dān)心的差異是“護城河的寬度”。對于可口可樂，您可以非常有信心地認(rèn)為，用戶偏好不會迅速轉(zhuǎn)向飲用其他汽水，特別是可口可樂。在技術(shù)領(lǐng)域，我們可能更頻繁地看到“范式轉(zhuǎn)換”，舊的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者被新的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者所取代。圖形用戶界面取代字符用戶界面，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)爆炸等。)

In the absence of a paradigm shift in technology, market shares seldom change by more than a few points. With a paradigm shift, the shares can rapidly change by dozens of points. I spent my first ten years at Microsoft building Microsoft Office. We were way behind in share most of that time (less than 10%). but the shift to graphical user interface was the paradigm shift that allowed us to displace the old leaders (Lotus 1-2-3 and WordPerfect) and now be at 90% share. Of course, key to this shift in share. was their failure to identify the computing paradigm shift and properly invest in it. They were the leaders and they could have chosen to cannibalize themselves. But they didn’t act fast enough and were scared that investing in the new paradigm would open the door for us – ironically it was their slow pace that opened the door. 在技術(shù)沒有發(fā)生范式轉(zhuǎn)換的情況下，市場份額很少會改變超過幾個點。但在范式轉(zhuǎn)換的情況下，份額可能迅速變化幾十個點。我在微軟的前十年里一直在建立微軟辦公室。我們的份額大部分時間都很低（不到10%）。但是圖形用戶界面的轉(zhuǎn)變是范式轉(zhuǎn)變，它使我們?nèi)〈伺f的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者（Lotus 1-2-3和WordPerfect），現(xiàn)在占有90%的份額。當(dāng)然，這種份額轉(zhuǎn)移的關(guān)鍵是他們沒有識別計算范式轉(zhuǎn)變并適當(dāng)投資。他們是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，他們可以選擇自我毀滅。但他們沒有行動得足夠快，害怕投資新范式會為我們打開大門-具有諷刺意味的是他們緩慢的步伐打開了大門。

總結(jié)一下，Jeff Raikes 對于微軟生意的描述是非常清楚的。

微軟的核心就是兩個生意：

（1） OEM 生意，即向個人PC的制造商收取windows 操作系統(tǒng)的費用。當(dāng)時，windows 已經(jīng)壟斷了90%以上的市場份額，所以可以對每一臺電腦收取過路費。

（2）軟件生意。在用戶買下電腦之后，微軟依然可以通過售賣軟件（主要是office）來賺錢。1996年的時候，從全球銷售的5000萬臺電腦，微軟從平均每臺電腦上賣出了140美元的軟件，營收70億。

同時，微軟這兩個生意是有協(xié)同效應(yīng)的。Windows 系統(tǒng)賣得稍微便宜一點也無妨，只要維持住壟斷的市場份額，軟件生意就可以帶來源源不斷的利潤。

如果我是巴菲特的話，面對這樣的生意，我肯定是會投資的。然而，在巴菲特的思維方式中，對于護城河的考慮永遠是第一位的，微軟的生意可能目前非常強大，但是誰也不知道會不會突然出現(xiàn)新的人機交互方式，然后突然顛覆掉微軟看似很寬的護城河。

我們看巴菲特是怎么回復(fù)的：

Your analysis of Microsoft, why I should invest in it, and why I don’t could be more on the money. In effect the company has a royalty on a communication stream that can do nothing but grow. It’s as if you were getting paid for every gallon of water starting in a small stream but with added amounts received as tributaries turned the stream into an Amazon. The toughest question is how hard to push prices and I wrote a note to Bill on that after our December meeting last year. Bell should have anticipated Bill and let someone else put in the phone infrastructure while he collected by the minute and distance (and even importance of 1hr call he could have figured a wait to monitor it) in perpetuity. （你對微軟公司的分析、我為什么應(yīng)該投資它以及為什么我沒有投資完全正確。實際上，該公司正在對一種不斷增長的通信流的使用權(quán)收取專利費。就好像你開始從一條小溪的每加侖水收取報酬，隨著支流轉(zhuǎn)化成了亞馬遜河，你收到的量也越來越多。最困難的問題是如何確定價格，去年我們12月的會議后，我給比爾寫了一張便條。貝爾應(yīng)該預(yù)見到比爾的行動，并讓其他人在電話基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施上投資，而他則通過每分鐘和每公里的計費方式（甚至可以根據(jù)一小時通話的重要性來監(jiān)控它）來永久收費。）

Coke is now getting a royalty on swallows; probably 7.2 billion a day. If this average gulp is one ounce. I feel 100% sure (perhaps mistakenly) that I know the odds of this continuing-again 100% as long as cola doesn’t cause cancer. Bill has an even better royalty-one which I would never bet against but I don’t feel I am capable of assessing probabilities about, except to the extent that with a gun to my head and forced to make a guess, I would go with it rather than against. But to calibrate whether my certainty is 80% or 55%, say. For a 20-year run would be folly. if I had to make such decisions, I would do my best but I prefer to structure investing as a no-called-strikes game and just wait for the fat one.（可口可樂現(xiàn)在每天從每一口咽下去的飲料中獲得版稅，可能達到72億美元。如果這個平均吞咽量是一盎司，我有 100% 的把握（也許是錯誤的）認(rèn)為這種情況會持續(xù)下去——只要可樂不會引起癌癥。比爾有一個更好的使用權(quán)，我永遠不會打賭反對它，但我不認(rèn)為自己能夠?qū)Ω怕蔬M行評估，除非在被逼無奈、被指著槍膛必須猜測的情況下，我會選擇贊同它而不是反對它。但要衡量我的確信度是 80% 還是 55%，例如為期 20 年的周期，那就是愚蠢的。如果我必須做出這樣的決定，我會盡力而為，但我更喜歡將投資變成永不出局的無風(fēng)險游戲，并等待好的機會。）

I watched Ted Williams on cable the other day and he referred to a book called the science of hitting which I then ran down. It has a drawing of the batters box in it that he had referred to on the show with lots of little squares in it, all parts of the strike zone. In his favourites spot, the box showed .400 reflecting what he felt he would hit if he only swung at pitches in that area. Low and outsized, but still in the strike zone, he got down to .260. Of course, if he had two strikes on him, he was going to swing at that .260 pitch but otherwise he waited for one in the “happy zone” as he put it. I think the same approach makes sense in investing.（我之前有一天在電視上看到了泰德·威廉姆斯，他提到了一本書叫《打擊科學(xué)》。我隨后去查了一下這本書。書里有一個擊球區(qū)的圖畫，他在節(jié)目中提到了它，上面有很多小方格，都是打擊區(qū)域的一部分。在他最喜歡的位置上，方框里寫著.400，反映了他認(rèn)為如果他只擊打那個區(qū)域的球，他將能夠達到的擊球率。如果球低而大，但仍在打擊區(qū)內(nèi)，他的擊球率將下降至0.260。當(dāng)然，如果他面臨兩個被投手投到一個區(qū)域的機會，他會擊打那個0.260的球，但除此之外，他會等待一個“甜蜜區(qū)”的球。我認(rèn)為這種方法在投資方面也是有意義的。）

Your happy zone, because of the business experience you have had, what you see every day, your natural talents, etc. is going to be different than mine. I am sure, moreover that you can hit balls better in my happy zone than l can in yours just because they are fatter pitches in general. （由于你擁有的商業(yè)經(jīng)驗、每天看到的事情、天生的才能等等，你的“甜蜜區(qū)域”會與我的不同。此外，我相信你在我的快樂區(qū)域中打球會比我在你的快樂區(qū)域中打得更好，只是因為一般來說它們是更好擊打的球。）

總結(jié)：巴菲特認(rèn)可微軟的投資價值。就像是一條小溪流過，微軟可以對這條小溪的每一瓢水進行收費。而且，這條小溪注定會逐漸長大，變成大河，所以微軟的收費可能會變得更多。然而，巴菲特對于每一瓢水到底能收多少錢并不是很確定，同時對于微軟20年后的情況也完全沒有把握。

相反，可口可樂也可以看作是對人的每一口吞咽進行收費，而人總要囤咽（喝東西）的。在巴菲特看來，他對可口可樂的收費能力100%有信心，所以投資可樂是一件非常確定的事情。

巴菲特說，“I prefer to structure investing as a no-called-strikes game and just wait for the fat one”，他希望把投資變成一個永不出局的游戲，永遠等待那個非常確定的擊球機會。

想一想，投資微軟，有機會獲得非常好的回報，但是有可能會失敗。如果必須在做多和做空當(dāng)中選一個的話，巴菲特會選擇做多。

而投資可樂，有100%的機會（當(dāng)然是巴菲特的主觀判斷）會獲得不錯的回報，盡管可能比微軟差不少。

在這種情況下，投資可樂肯定是更理性的選擇。就像芒格說的，如果一個人已經(jīng)有了確定的12%回報的機會，還去嫉妒別人獲得更高的回報，那簡直是瘋了。